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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

C-3

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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JANUARY 24, 2008

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 [b 6] This is [b)(6)] the 3
3 Corps Writing Historian from Center of Military
4 History.

5 [b)(3), (b)(6)] just
6 to validate the recording, could you go ahead and
7 introduce yourself in your own voice?

8 [b)(3), (b)(6)]
9 I go by [b)(3), (b)(6)]

10 [b)(3), (b)(6)] : Great. Thank you.
11 For the listener's benefit, the last interview was on
12 the 23rd of September and, if it is acceptable to you,
13 we will just consider the previous release agreement
14 to still be in effect.

15 [b 3, b 6] : It's acceptable.

16 [b 3, b 6] Great. My first
17 question was just to ask: Have there been any key
18 changes in the organization or staffing of the C-3
19 overall since we spoke at the last interview?

20 [b)(3), (b)(6)] : No major changes. Of
21 course, we have had the normal rotation of what we
22 call individual augmentees or IAs in and out, Navy,

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1 Air Force. Most of them rotate in on a four to six-
2 month basis.

3 We have had -- started to redeploy some
4 folks. For instance, I lost [REDACTED] to
5 CHOPS (Phonetic) about three weeks ago, redeployed
6 him. He was -- We had to get him back so he could get
7 his year of dwell in before he came back on the next
8 rotation.

9 [REDACTED] I wanted to ask just
10 kind of first a big picture question, which is: As
11 you look back to our last discussion in late September
12 and where we are today, could you just kind of bring
13 us up to speed on a current update on what the
14 operational situation is in Iraq right now and what is
15 different from where we were four months ago?

16 [REDACTED] I think there is probably
17 three things that jump in my mind as being different
18 as I think back to September.

19 I think Sadr had just declared his
20 ceasefire at that time or just before that, and we
21 were still very much in a wait and see how much of an
22 impact that would actually have.

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1 I think it is pretty well accepted that it
2 has had an impact on the level of violence,
3 particularly on the -- obviously, on the Shia and JAM
4 side. There is still Shia violence ongoing against
5 Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and Iraqi
6 civilians, but it is very much a splinter group, we
7 think, or special group that is not following the JAM
8 ceasefire, Sadr ceasefire. That has definitely had an
9 impact.

10 I think probably the other thing that was
11 just beginning or just starting and was in no way
12 mature was Concerned Local Citizens or the CLC
13 program. If I'm correct, we were just starting that
14 program or had just started, and I think we are up to
15 a little over 80,000 now of Concerned Local Citizens
16 in Iraq, mostly Baghdad, MND-C just south of Baghdad,
17 some up north, a few out west.

18 Probably the third thing that I think has
19 probably been a major change since September is
20 Phantom Phoenix, the third Corps major operation
21 behind Phantom Thunder, Phantom Strike and now Phantom
22 Phoenix.

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1 Phoenix was basically a response to our
2 assessment that al Qaeda, although not completely, had
3 been somewhat or mostly driven out of Baghdad,
4 Baqubah, al Anbar, and were migrating north,
5 establishing sanctuaries, safe havens, training areas
6 in the upper Diyala River Valley vicinity of
7 Moqtadiyah and the Hammerin Lake in the Zahb
8 (Phonetic) Triangle Area along ASR Golden out by Lake
9 Tharthar (Phonetic), and migrating up toward Mosul.

10 So Phoenix was really a realization that
11 we needed to continue the pursuit of al Qaeda, and
12 started Phoenix, I think, setting the conditions on or
13 about the first of January. I think the actual
14 operation started on the 8th, and is ongoing as of
15 today.

16 [b 3, b 6]: Great.

17 (b)(6): (b)(3), (b)(6) you mentioned
18 Phantom Phoenix. I would like to take you back to
19 June at the beginning of Phantom Thunder, and could
20 you walk us through Phantom Thunder, what you think
21 that accomplished, to Phantom Strike. You have
22 already discussed Phantom Phoenix. So that will sort

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1 of summarize and bring us up, if you would start with
2 Phantom Thunder back in June.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6)

4 I think they are all
5 linked in purpose. Of course, 15 June was when we got
6 the last surge brigade in. So Phantom Thunder was
7 really the Corps' plan to go into areas that had been
8 really long term al Qaeda safe havens and sanctuaries,
9 mostly in the Baghdad Belts, south of Baghdad in Arab
10 Jabour, down in toward Moqtadiyah, Iskandariyah, to
11 the north in Balad Ruse (Phonetic), Kambanisahd
(Phonetic), Baqubah and up a little bit into the DRV.

12 I say it was tied in purpose, because
13 really the purpose of Phantom Thunder was to take
14 those sanctuaries away from al Qaeda, and then, of
15 course, the fight out west was on a significant
16 downward trend.

17 Well, actually, it wasn't. It was on a
18 downward trend. It really turn significant until --
19 I take that back. Out west it was on a significant
20 downward trend by June, but to go into areas where al
21 Qaeda felt safe, felt they had sanctuaries, were able
22 to train and, most importantly, stage high profile

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1 attacks into Baghdad, to take those areas away from
2 them.

3 That was really why Thunder was designed
4 and executed, and the five surge brigade gave us the
5 capability to go into that terrain that we had never
6 been able to get to before, never had the combat power
7 to get to.

8 The focus of the five surge brigades --
9 we've covered this before -- it was not necessarily
10 inside of Baghdad, but it was on the accelerants
11 getting into Baghdad, car bombs in cases of the Sunni.

12 The only thing different about Thunder, I
13 think, is it was also a Shia extremist focused
14 operation as well. Some significant operations in and
15 around Sadr City, a new Baghdad area that the
16 traditional Shia extremists safe havens or strong
17 points, if you will. Significant operations up into
18 Baqubah, which is a significant fault line between
19 Sunni and Shia against the Shia extremists, and that
20 was really the two focus areas in Baghdad.

21 I said, you know, on the east side, also
22 on the west side of the river, Shia; east and west

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1 Rasheed, to get in there and clean that out of both al
2 Qaeda and the Shia extremists.

3 Once again, it was to break the cycle of
4 sectarian violence. So to break that cycle, we had to
5 stop the car bombs from coming in, killing massive
6 amounts of Shia, and then the Shia retaliation for
7 those suicide attacks or those attacks against the
8 Shia at gatherings.

9 I think, about a two or three month effort
10 to do that, and then we went into Phantom Strike,
11 because what we saw with Thunder was the migration
12 of, in particular, al Qaeda, and then as al Qaeda
13 migrated, the migration of Shia special groups right
14 in behind them to try to control that area.

15 So Strike was designed to go after a
16 phenomenon that we started looking at, because that
17 was about the same time that we were losing -- The
18 primary killer of our soldiers at that time was the
19 buried IEDs. So we plotted where most of the buried
20 IEDs were happening, down near (Inaudible), and then
21 where we thought al Qaeda was trying to reestablish
22 sanctuaries or still had sanctuary area to stage and

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1 train, and they corresponded very, very closely.

2 So Strike was really the first pursuit
3 operation of al Qaeda. If Thunder got them moving,
4 Strike was a pursuit, and it also had a Shia focus in
5 terms of where the Shia sectarian violence against the
6 Sunnis was occurring.

7 Continued to drive them primarily north up
8 the DRV, the Diyala River Valley, to south of Baghdad
9 but drove them further south down into southern Arab
10 Jabour, and then west. Al Anbar by that time had been
11 pretty much -- We think most of al Qaeda had been
12 driven out of al Anbar.

13 So the migration was definitely to the
14 north at that point up Tampa, Samarra, Balad area, up
15 the Diyala River Valley toward Moqtadiyah and then up
16 toward Mosul and along the Hammerin (Phonetic)
17 Mountain range. That's when Phantom Phoenix came
18 around.

19 b 6 Do they have definite -- like
20 Thunder and Strike, did they have definite end dates
21 where you concluded you've accomplished what you set
22 out to do?

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1 [b 3, b 6] When we designed them,
2 they did not. Thunder was an open-ended operation,
3 and Thunder, I think, really didn't end until we
4 started Strike; because it almost rolled directly into
5 Phantom Strike.

6 Now Phantom Strike -- Although we never
7 published an end date or stated an end date, I think
8 Phantom Strike probably came to conclusion in the
9 November time frame.

10 Then we went into an analysis phase to
11 kind of try to figure out where we were with primarily
12 al Qaeda at that point, started coming together in the
13 December time frame, started socializing the concept
14 with the boss in mid-December, kicked it off on 1
15 January.

16 [b(3), b(6)]: I wanted to ask a few
17 more questions about Phantom Phoenix. Just as you
18 look back on that being the last main operation of 3
19 Corps as the base command element for Multinational
20 Corps-Iraq, as you think back through the process,
21 through getting with General Odierno and the plans
22 process that you talked to us about before, what

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1 sticks out in your mind as the pieces of that
2 operational planning process that engendered the most
3 discussion, the most debate.

4 I know there was some realignment of the
5 units, for instance, some decisions about where to put
6 the reserve, these sorts of things. As you think back
7 on that process, can you talk us through what you
8 think were some of the key decisions in that, that the
9 boss had to make, and which were the toughest ones?

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, obviously, I mean
11 I think probably the thing that sticks out in my mind
12 is even with -- and we lost -- We didn't lose. 31 Cav
13 was -- The conditions were set to pull 31 Cav out as
14 part of the first move from 20 to 15 in late December,
15 and 31 Cav was up in the Baqubah area and little bit
16 up into the DRV, Diyala River Valley.

17 So there was a pretty significant movement
18 of forces as 31 Cav came out and 42 Stryker assumed
19 that battle space. So that was all being orchestrated
20 while we were talking about where we need to focus for
21 Phantom Phoenix.

22 I think one of the things that the boss

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1 has been very focused on, and he has done very well,
2 is even as a brigade comes out, it will be the same as
3 we go down to 15 -- as a brigade comes out, we are
4 just not unplugging the brigade. There is a backfill
5 of units into that space.

6 So actually, in Diyala we have more combat
7 power there now than we did when 31 Cav was up there,
8 and part of that was the commitment of his operational
9 reserve 242 to operate up in the area we call the
10 bread basket just on the west side of Moqtadiyah.

11 The thing that sticks out in my mind is,
12 even with 19 brigade combat teams, you still don't
13 have everything that you want to go to the areas you
14 think you need to get to. The Diyala River Valley was
15 probably -- is probably the biggest part of Phantom
16 Phoenix, if there was a main effort of Phantom
17 Phoenix.

18 Southern Arab Jabour, we pulled 57 Cav
19 from MNF-West, gave that operational control of that
20 to MND-Center, General Lynch in 3 ID, to operate south
21 of Baghdad. Then about the same time, we were
22 bringing 225 Stryker in to rip out with 11 Cav. So

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1 there was a significant shifting of forces that went
2 on associated with Phantom Phoenix.

3 All that looks easy, but it is hard to
4 orchestrate, and it does involve some pretty hefty
5 decisions by the boss in terms of where he is going to
6 pull from; because every time you pull from someplace,
7 you do accept some level of risk to go someplace else.

8 (b)(6): He also put the Cav up north,
9 right, the MND-B Cav?

10 (b)(3), (b)(6): We put 18 Infantry, yes.
11 18 Infantry went up to Mosul.

12 (b)(6): Oh, okay.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6): That's (b)(3), (b)(6) out
14 of -- 3d Brigade of 4th ID is his parent brigade. He
15 was due to come in and occupy battle space in Baghdad
16 in Kodahmiyah (Phonetic). And that is exactly right.
17 Taking a full battalion set out of Baghdad, you know,
18 your main effort, and pushing it out to Mosul implies
19 or does -- He is assuming some risk by doing that.

20 So the decision on where to take -- It's
21 not so much where you apply the combat power. It is
22 where you take it from, I think, is probably the

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1 weighty decisions, because you do assume risk when you
2 do that.

3 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Was there much push-
4 back from the divisions in terms of who was being
5 taken from who, and an you speak a little bit to that?

6 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : There's always a little
7 push-back.

8 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Did any of that rise
9 to the boss's level or did that happen sort of at the
10 3 to 3 level?

11 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Mostly 3 to 3. I mean,
12 commanders are all good enough to understand the
13 bigger picture and what the boss is after, and General
14 Odierno is very good about explaining what he's after
15 and what his intent is and why he is doing what he is
16 doing. So it usually gets handled at the 3 level.

17 I mean, there is always angst when you are
18 taking resources away from a unit.

19 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : I wanted to ask one
20 more thing about Phantom Phoenix. When the operation
21 first started, there seemed to be a -- certainly, in
22 the open media, and there seemed to be some discussion

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1 about how much of a surprise was lost, the surprise
2 factor, so to speak, and the issue of the Iraqi Army,
3 Iraqi Force elements that were involved, who was
4 informed when, were the enemy already gone by the time
5 we got there in some of the key areas when we first
6 kicked it off. Can you comment on what really
7 happened there, from your perspective?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6): Well, a couple of things.
9 One is we moved a brigade from the 1st IA, the 3d
10 Brigade of the 1st IA from al-Anbar into Baqubah -- or
11 into Diyala, the province of Diyala. We moved a
12 Stryker battalion from Baghdad up there, and it's just
13 -- It's impossible to hide movement of those size
14 units. So we plussed up the strength up there
15 significantly.

16 So I think the expectation that nobody
17 would have any idea that anything was going to go on
18 is unrealistic. So I think that's just natural.
19 There's going to be expectation that something is
20 going to go on.

21 We have also -- the thing that never got
22 covered -- picked up a few al Qaeda mid-level leaders

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1 that, when questioned, said that if they had known we
2 were coming, they would have left. So we may not have
3 surprised everybody, but we certainly surprised some.

4 So I think that it was a complete -- not
5 complete. It was a success in terms of achieving
6 surprise.

7 The stuff in the media about not informing
8 the Iraqis until the last minute, that's kind of the
9 way things -- That is an attempt to maintain op sec,
10 and it's not the leadership of the Iraqi Army who we
11 worry about. It's the foot soldiers. Sometimes --
12 Very few intentionally, but mostly just
13 unintentionally start talking at the wrong time, at
14 the wrong place. Somebody overhears something, and
15 that word gets relayed to somebody that shouldn't hear
16 it.

17 So the way they did that in terms of
18 bringing the Iraqi units into it at the last minute,
19 the last day or so, that's kind of normal. That is
20 not abnormal for the way things are done.

21 Then if you look at what I said earlier
22 and what the purpose of Phantom Phoenix was,

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1 especially in the upper Diyala River Valley, was to
2 not allow them to stage, train and -- stage for
3 attacks, train and establish a sanctuary, they are not
4 there. You know, whether it is because we killed or
5 captured them or because we forced them to move
6 someplace else and kept them moving, they are not
7 staging attacks from the upper Diyala River Valley.

8 So I would say, even if some of them got
9 wind, moved, there was a level of success involved in
10 that.

11 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Not wanting to
12 continue beat this horse, but I mention it only
13 because the CG had made a passing comment about it:
14 The weather at that particular time, what was supposed
15 to be the start of Phantom Phoenix -- (Inaudible) from
16 his comments that he implied that actually the start
17 date ended up being delayed by two to three days
18 because of weather conditions. Does that stick in
19 your mind as something that --

20 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes, mostly weather had
21 an impact on the rotary wing aviation in the ISR.

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Do you think that

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1 played into any of this perception that there was more
2 of an opportunity for --

3 [b 3, b 6] I don't think so. I
4 don't think so. I think it would have been -- I think
5 somebody would have published that story, whether it
6 was -- I think it was originally slated to start on
7 the -- I think it was on the 4th, and we had to start
8 on the 8th. I would have to go back and look to be
9 sure, but I think if we started on time, I think
10 somebody would have said that.

11 I think it's just the reality of moving
12 that much stuff around.

13 [b(6)] [b(3), (b)(6)] I would like
14 to ask you kind of a reflective question on the C-3
15 organization.

16 You have worked now -- You changed the
17 structure to fold into Plans under you from the
18 previous Corps that had a C-5, and I understand 18th
19 Corps is coming in with a separate C-5.

20 I'd like you to reflect a minute, talk
21 about the effectiveness of your lash-up, the way 3
22 Corps did it for this rotation.

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1 [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Actually 5th Corps did
2 not have a separate C-5. 3 Corps the last time over
3 here had a separate C-5, and I'm not sure what 18th
4 Airborne Corps had. They replaced, you know, the 45th
5 Corps. But [redacted] b 3 b 6 was the C-3 before me, and he
6 had Plans underneath him.

7 You know, at the Corps level I think
8 there's pluses and minuses of doing it either way.
9 Obviously, you know, the stuff that I have to get
10 involved in is much broader, if I've also got the
11 Plans function underneath me. But I've got some
12 pretty good 06s, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in Plans, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in
13 FuOps, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) as the CHOPs, that I
14 can kind of maintain wave tops and keep them moving in
15 the right direction, and that's really what I've done.

16
17 I think the advantage -- and I prefer to
18 do it the way we did it with Plans, FuOps and Current
19 Ops all underneath me, just for the ability to keep
20 those three areas sync'ed and tied together.

21 So as plans are generated longer range, I
22 can bring to that process an eye on what's going on

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1 shorter range, future ops, and then what is currently
2 going on today in terms of current ops, and the same
3 way around.

4 Working with the planners all the time, I
5 know what we are thinking two months down the road
6 when I talk to the guys that are working what's
7 happening over the next couple of weeks, and then the
8 current operations piece.

9 So that's not saying that it can't be
10 done. There's pluses and minuses either way, and
11 whatever -- I think it's whatever the CG is really
12 comfortable with, is the way to go.

13 (b)(6) And he was comfortable with
14 this lash-up?

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) He hasn't fired me. So
16 I'm assuming he's comfortable.

17 b 3, b 6: (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask
18 about some ISF, Iraqi Security Force, perspective from
19 your standpoint. One of the things, I think, since we
20 talked last, it seems as if, as a casual observer
21 watching it, that the ISF has continued to do more
22 independent type of things.

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1 I'm thinking about Operations Lions Paw,
2 just recently the reinforcement issue up in Mosul
3 after the bomb blast up there. Also is this continued
4 evolution and establishment of these regional
5 operation centers.

6 Can you kind of link those together, and
7 tell me what you are seeing as the continued
8 development of the Iraqi Security Forces, both what
9 that means in a good way and what the challenges are
10 in continuing to work this relationship we have with
11 them?

12 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, you know, it's kind
13 of an advantage and a disadvantage. I was here in
14 2004 when we had -- Let's see, we started off with the
15 ICDC, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and then went to
16 the Iraqi National Guard and then turned into the
17 Iraqi Army.

18 So I remember back at that time and then
19 look at where they are at now. It is amazing, you
20 know. What we've really done is standing up their
21 army from scratch, and this is not taking an army and
22 retraining it. This is standing up an army from

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1 scratch. Where they have come in just four years, I
2 think, is incredible.

3 That's my advantage. Now I look at the
4 year or 14 months, whatever it's been I've been here
5 this time. It's kind of like watching your kids grow
6 up. I mean, they're babies, and then before you know
7 it, they are graduating from high school.

8 So you don't really see it when you are
9 involved with it every day. But looking back on the
10 year, I think there has been some pretty significant
11 growth.

12 You mentioned 8th IA and Lions Paw down in
13 Diwaniyah. I mean, that was completely an Iraqi
14 organized, planned, run, resourced operation. They
15 moved a tank company by themselves from Taji down to
16 Diwaniyah for operations. They moved an Iraqi Army
17 battalion from al-Anbar to Diwaniyah.

18 General Uthman (Phonetic), the CG of 8th
19 IA down there brought all that together and has done
20 a fantastic job in Diwaniyah. Diwaniyah has been
21 quite for three months now.

22 I mentioned earlier the Iraqis by

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1 themselves with no help from us at all moved 3d
2 Brigade of the 1st IA with about seven days notice
3 from al-Anbar into Diyala, about a two-day move; and
4 within 36 hours after they got there, they were
5 operational in Diyala, conducting operations. The
6 first major cache they found, I think, was within 36
7 hours of their arrival.

8 You know, the security situation in
9 Baghdad is significantly better, and we are actually
10 reducing -- We have reduced forces in Baghdad, and
11 more and more everyday the Iraqis are stepping up.
12 And it is just not independent operations. It is
13 combined operations and independent operations in
14 terms of their capability.

15 I think the major challenges that remain
16 with the Iraqi Army is what you would expect them to
17 be. Logistics are hard. Even for an army that's been
18 around for 200-plus years, I mean, logistics are just
19 not an easy thing to do, keeping supplies, people
20 paid, fed, etcetera, especially when you are talking
21 this type of numbers.

22 That and there are leadership issues at

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1 the noncommissioned officer and the officer level.
2 You know, in any army in the world, especially ones
3 that are worth anything, you don't go out and hire --
4 That's why you just can't replace a major, a captain,
5 sergeant major, sergeant first class. You can't just
6 go out in the street and hire somebody, because it's
7 experience that gets to where you've gotten.

8 So when you start with a zero experience
9 base or a limited experience base, you just can't
10 create that overnight. And it is not the senior
11 officer level, because a lot of those were hired out
12 of the old Iraqi Army.

13 It is at the company commander, the
14 operations officer at the battalion level, in some
15 cases the battalion commander level, and the senior
16 NCOs. You just can't go out and create those people
17 overnight.

18 It's going to be a long term growing of
19 that leadership skill in this army. But for what they
20 have, where they started four years ago, I think they
21 have made incredible gains.

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) That piece about the

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1 operational centers and that sort of political -- Do
2 you see that as sort of a political-military crossover
3 point?

4 b 3, b 6

5 We started with the
6 Baghdad Op Center. I'm trying to think where that --
7 if that was our idea or that was an Iraqi idea. I
8 really can't remember. Probably doesn't matter. But
9 the (Inaudible) into the Baghdad Operational Center
10 or Operational Command or Op Center was basically,
11 obviously, focused on Baghdad, and it is the Prime
12 Minister's desire to have control of the security
13 effort in Baghdad, thus the Baghdad Operations Center
14 or Command was formed with General Aboud.

15 Really, what he wanted was -- The genesis
16 of all of it, and we definitely agree with this piece
17 of it -- is he wanted one commander as responsible
18 that he could turn to for security issues inside of
19 Baghdad, and from that we split the city in half down
20 the river and gave -- or recommended that there be one
21 commander responsible for the east side of the river,
22 one commander for the west side of the river, and then
split the city into 10 security districts and one

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1 commander for each one of those security districts.
2 When I say commander, these are Iraqi Commanders.

3 So really, just kind of pinning the rose
4 on somebody for security in Baghdad as you step down
5 the levels.

6 Then originally, although it hasn't worked
7 as well as we had hoped, or maybe not as hoped -- as
8 designed -- all security forces, to include the Iraqi
9 police, would work for General Aboud inside of Baghdad
10 or inside those 10 security districts.

11 That was a direct link between Aboud and
12 the Prime Minister. MOD had nominal oversight of
13 General Aboud. (Several words inaudible) to the Iraqi
14 Ground Forces Command. Minister of Defense, MOD, had
15 some oversight of it, but it was really a direct link
16 between Maliki and Aboud for security issues inside of
17 Baghdad.

18 Now I think what the Prime Minister saw is
19 that he enjoyed exercising that level of authority, I
20 guess, or having that level of control over the
21 security situation and the ability to direct things
22 that affect the security in Baghdad.

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1 Then you know, as Baghdad was starting to
2 calm down, Diyala was kind of flaring up, and I think
3 the Diyala Op Center was the next one we stood up. It
4 was stood up because of the crisis that was --
5 quote/unquote, "crisis" that was going on in Diyala.

6 That is really where the Op Centers have
7 merged and grown to, is they are supposed to be stood
8 up -- or they are being stood up in areas where there
9 is a crisis.

10 Now militarily, I guess, from a security
11 standpoint, the ability to appoint one commander to
12 answer directly to a central authority, whether that
13 is the Minister of Defense or the Prime Minister, for
14 security issues in that province is probably a good
15 thing.

16 Politically, I think what has happened is
17 under the Iraqi Constitution the Provincial Governor
18 has control of the Iraqi Police in the Provincial
19 Council that operates. So that the Prime Minister
20 really has very little control except through the PDOP
21 or the Provincial Director of Police and the Governor
22 into the local security matters.

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1 When you stand up one of these op centers
2 and appoint a military commander that has authority
3 over all security matters, it gives, I think -- and
4 this is just my opinion. I think it gives the Prime
5 Minister a way of influencing the security situation
6 in each of the provinces.

7 So I think these have started to pop up as
8 a way for the Prime Minister to get his arms around
9 the security situation in the provinces without having
10 to work through a governor or a provincial director of
11 police. That's just my personal opinion, but that's
12 what I see.

13 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Great. Thanks.

14 [REDACTED] b 6

[REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

you had

15 mentioned Diwanayah and the 8th Iraqi Division going
16 down there. But would you please review just the
17 Corps effort, the CF effort to support MND-CS, and
18 evaluate the effect of this support; because I do
19 remember that back in October-September time frame
20 there was a crisis mode back in CS.

21 When they briefed the BUAs, they would
22 always seem to be in a crisis mode. Now I don't see

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1 that when I come back in January. It seems to be
2 pretty calm down there.

3 b 3 b 6: Diwaniyah is always -- I
4 mean, that is a Shia -- I mean, there is no Sunni
5 issues, no al Qaeda issues in Diwaniyah. So it is
6 really an internal Shia issue between -- and we never
7 really completely understand that, but it's really a
8 struggle for power, I think, between Badr and JAM in
9 Diwaniyah.

10 There are -- Center South calls them rogue
11 JAM, and they call them militant JAM, and I tend to
12 agree with their categorization. It is really not
13 special groups. It is Shia extremists, probably JAM
14 affiliated, that have not followed Sadr's ceasefire,
15 really not following Sadr, the Sadr trend, much at
16 all.

17 Diwaniyah wasn't something new. 4 ID,
18 their last rotation -- I mean, they are back now, but
19 their rotation previous -- had sent a battalion to
20 Diwaniyah to get things settled down, and then back,
21 oh, I think it was the summer -- I've forgotten the
22 month now -- indirect fire -- I mean, 80 rockets and

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1 mortars one night at Camp Echo, and that's when we had
2 to send a battalion down there to do some clearing
3 operations.

4 Every time we went down there, what
5 happened is all the militant JAM would just leave. We
6 would do operations there for about two, three weeks,
7 get a lid back on things, turn it back over to the
8 small number of Iraqi Army that was in the city and
9 the Iraqi Police. We would leave, and then three
10 months later you're right back in the same. So they
11 just come back and start it all up again.

12 A couple things that happened is we put --
13 Well, probably the primary thing is this rotation of
14 the Poles, which are TOA-ing today between nine and
15 ten, Rotation 9 brought more combat power with them in
16 terms of -- same numbers but more of it was allocated
17 -- There were more soldiers that could get off the FOB
18 and do work out in Diwaniyah.

19 So this rotation of Poles, from my
20 perspective, have been the best out of the three that
21 I have seen, because they got off the FOB and they got
22 out into Diwaniyah, and they actually did security

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1 work out in Diwaniyah.

2 They have picked up the concept of the
3 joint security stations that got started with the
4 previous rotation, and they expanded that. I don't
5 know how many they've got now, but it's a lot more
6 than the one that was there on rotation 8.

7 General Uthman (Phonetic), who has
8 responsibility for Kadasiyah (Phonetic) Province,
9 which Diwaniyah sits in, allocated a battalion, an
10 Iraqi Army battalion, to that. The Iraqis moved
11 another battalion from Anbar to operate.

12 So what is different in Diwaniyah right
13 now, in the last two months we have had two Iraqi Army
14 battalions that have been in Diwaniyah every day 24/7,
15 same concept we follow. They are in and amongst the
16 population, protecting the population, day and night.

17 They have established joint security
18 stations all through Diwaniyah. The Poles have been
19 out with them. Center-South forces have been out with
20 them, and we've had some pretty significant and
21 successful SOF operations, CJSOTF, and the Poles also
22 brought a special operations element with them. They

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1 have been operating successfully with the Iraqi Army
2 down there.

3 So I think we applied the pressure. IN
4 many ways, the same thing happened. They left the
5 city. We maintained the pressure. So they weren't
6 able to come back in, and then as things started to
7 calm down in Diwaniyah, this Polish rotation and
8 CJSOTF and the Polish Special Operations Forces also
9 targeted them, where they went.

10 So there have been some -- Outside of
11 Diwaniyah, inside the province and into other
12 provinces where they have fled to, there have been
13 some targeting going on. So I think the pressure has
14 been maintained this time.

15 [b 6] They have stayed there.

16 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Correct.

17 Now the long term issues for Diwaniyah are
18 the Iraqi Police. The Iraqi Police has just never --
19 I mean, we've just never been able to get them to the
20 point where they can maintain that pressure.

21 Force Gen. for 8th IA -- there is another
22 Iraqi Army battalion being generated that will go into

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1 Diwaniyah. So it would be two battalions in
2 Diwaniyah. That may be enough to do it.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) I wanted to ask a
4 broader question about Combined Joint Special
5 Operations Task Force, CJSOTF. As you look back over
6 this entire tour, now coming down to the last couple
7 of weeks, I'm just curious to know how you've seen
8 this special operations piece and that relationship
9 with our conventional forces.

10 Has that been something that, in your
11 mind, has been successful? To what degree has it bee
12 successful, and has that relationship changed over the
13 course of this tour?

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) I'll talk a little bit
15 broader than that. I think -- I mean, the experience
16 as a commander over here in '04 and early '05, I think
17 the synchronization and lash-up between Special Ops
18 Forces, CJSOTF and others and conventional forces is
19 probably better than we could ever expect it to be.

20 I think there is daily synchronization
21 that goes on between the Special Ops Forces and
22 conventional forces, and I think over the last couple

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1 of years we have really learned to play to each
2 other's strengths.

3 I think one of the things that is kind of
4 unique is, once the concerned locals -- because before
5 as a battle space owner, if you really wanted to --
6 one of the first places you went when you tried to get
7 a feel for what was going on in your battle space were
8 the SOF forces that were out there, you know, working
9 with the population and talking to the citizens every
10 day.

11 When you try to find out who the power
12 brokers were, one of your main sources of information
13 was you go to whatever SOF force was working in that
14 area.

15 When CLCs started standing up and working
16 with the conventional forces, in some ways that's
17 turned around 180 degrees. So now I've had several
18 units tell me that now what you find is that the
19 battle space owners actually have a better feel for
20 who the power brokers are and who the movers and
21 shakers are in the battle space, because of their work
22 with the CLCs, which I think has brought special Ops

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1 Forces and conventional forces even closer, because
2 they are working a lot of the same tasks.

3 SOF -- They bring very unit capabilities
4 and skill sets, but I think that we have done a pretty
5 good job about capitalizing on what they bring,
6 integrating that with conventional, and then also
7 using conventional to support the SOF operations.

8 [b 3, b 6]

Great.

9 [(b)(6)]

[(b)(3), (b)(6)]

I would like
10 to talk a little bit about the Multinational Corps-
11 Iraq's lines of operation that you outlined in your
12 operations orders that go back to, really, your
13 operational concept in March. They were the same in
14 07-01 as they are in 08-01.

15 [b 3, b 6]

Right.

16 [(b)(6)]

And there are three of them.
17 You have already talked about the security one, and
18 actually, you have already talked about, through a
19 previous question, the capable, credible ISF.

20 What I would like you to talk a little bit
21 about is how the Corps sees the legitimate and capable
22 government line of operation, how you feel we are

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1 moving in that area.

2 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Slower than we would
3 like, and the Corps' focus is really at the provincial
4 level, local and provincial level.

5 [REDACTED] b 6 Right.

6 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Although at General
7 Odierno's level, he does have the opportunity, and
8 uses that opportunity, to try to influence the central
9 government in terms of development.

10 You know, probably the thing that has come
11 the furthest is the allocation of budgets from the
12 central government to the province, and then something
13 we have been very focused on is getting the provinces
14 to budget and execute the budget they have been given.

15 I think we've seen some pretty significant
16 progress. It sounds like a simple thing for a local
17 government to spend the money they have been given to
18 spend, but it's been exceptionally difficult. So I
19 think we've seen some progress there.

20 You know, back in 2005, I guess it was,
21 when we had the provincial elections, obviously, most
22 of the Sunnis didn't vote. So we have some inequities

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1 in representation in provincial councils that I think
2 is only going to be fixed with another round of
3 elections.

4 Mosul, Nineveh really sticks out in my
5 mind and is a predominant Sunni Arab population in and
6 around Mosul, but it is really a Kurdish Provincial
7 Council. So whether there is -- and it's more
8 perceptions than it is reality.

9 So the Sunni Arabs feel like they are
10 underrepresented or not represented at all, their
11 interests aren't represented, which causes tension,
12 which leads to sectarian -- potentially at least, and
13 hopefully not in that area -- tension between the
14 Sunni majority in that area, Sunni Arab majority in
15 that area and the Kurdish minority that just happens
16 to be sitting predominantly on the provincial council.

17 Basic services aren't really a provincial
18 issue, but the Director Generals in each of the
19 provinces work with the central government for
20 provision of the central services.

21 Out of all the lines of operations, Bill,
22 to tell you the truth, I think development of a

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1 governmental capability, whether it's local,
2 provincial or even national, is probably the most
3 frustrating thing, just because it moves so slowly.

4 I don't think that is unexpected or -- and
5 I don't think it is unrealistic to say that that is
6 going to move slowly. I mean, you are really taking
7 a society and thrust the concept of democracy on them
8 and equal representation that's completely foreign to
9 everybody in this country, and expect them to pick it
10 up in four years, and it is just going to grow slow.
11 But I think that is probably -- you know, for 18th
12 Airborne Corps' time here -- and I hope this is true
13 -- 18th Airborne Corps' time here and then whatever
14 corps follows them -- I think it's I Corps supposed to
15 follow them -- I think that has got to be -- We've got
16 to see some growth in the governance capability, you
17 know, representative governance at the provincial,
18 national, local level, to see progress sustained.

19 The security situation is good enough
20 right now. There is an open window for them to step
21 through and, if they don't step through it, it's just
22 a question of how long that window is going to stay

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1 open, I think.

2 (b)(6) Are you optimistic?

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) I am.

4 (b)(6) Based on what you know?

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) I am. I think Iraqis are

6 optimistic, which makes me optimistic. I think they
7 see that things can be better. I think Maliki has
8 made significant progress in the time we've been here.
9 Don't get me wrong. There's still a long way to go,
10 but I just think, you know, here we had a civil war 90
11 years after the founding of our country.

12 So it takes -- I mean, democracy takes a
13 while, in my mind, to take hold. Starting from a cold
14 start, this has never been about what's good for
15 everybody else. This has always been a society of
16 what's good for me, and it's just going to take a
17 generation or so to really kind of break that mindset.

18 Now I don't have -- and this is my
19 personal opinion here. I don't have any hopes for a
20 Jeffersonian democracy in Iraq, but I think that there
21 is great potential for some sort of stable, fairly
22 representative government at the national and

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1 provincial level.

2 Obviously, there is great opportunity for
3 -- I mean, there's just wealth throughout this
4 country, oil resources, agricultural resources, the
5 potential for tourism. So I think this could be a
6 very, very affluent country with some level of
7 representative government, stable.

8 I think Iraqis see that opportunity, and
9 I think 90 percent of the Iraqis want to capitalize on
10 that opportunity. So, yes, I'm optimistic.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6): The CG has kind of
12 voiced his frustration in a couple of cases about
13 detainee operations. I just wanted to kind of ask
14 where we're at with that. Has it been resolved? What
15 level did it get resolved? Where do we stand now in
16 terms of that interplay between the Corps' interest in
17 the practical matters of detainees, how they are
18 released, and tap into the relationship with Task
19 Force 14a that has the task of storing, processing and
20 trying to get these guys back into society.

21 b 3 b 6 I think there's been
22 natural -- There's always going to be natural tension,

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1 and really what is driving detainee release is really
2 two things.

3 Number one is we don't want -- actually,
4 there things. Number one is we don't want to detain
5 anybody, to begin with, and we certainly don't want to
6 continue to hold anybody that is no longer a threat to
7 society or us.

8 Number two is you reach a certain capacity
9 of detainees, and it starts to cause problems. So
10 we've pretty much reached full capacity at Camp Bucca
11 (Phonetic). So without expansion, you start to have
12 overcrowding conditions, and it causes issues.

13 Number three -- I'm going to give you four
14 reasons. Number three is that there are people out
15 there that would say one of the most frustrating
16 things to the Iraqis that continues to drive people
17 that are sitting on the sense onto the side of -- or
18 continuing to drive people to attack us or drive them
19 into the arms of the insurgency or al Qaeda is the
20 fact that we are still detaining their brother,
21 father, uncle, son, cousin, etcetera.

22 Then fourth is we got the UNSCR for 2008,

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1 but we think it will be some sort of status of forces
2 agreement after 2008, and we do not know what
3 authorities we will have to have to hold detainees
4 once the UNSCR runs out, the United Nations Security
5 Council Resolution.

6 So the numbers -- For all those reasons,
7 the numbers have to come down. So then you get the
8 debate of is this guy really -- you know, so you look
9 at this guy, this individual detainee, for example.
10 Is he still a threat to Coalition forces, Iraqi
11 Security Forces and society as a whole?

12 We only have a problem, and it's rarely,
13 when the battle space owner says yes, and he needs to
14 remain in detention, and for whatever reason down in
15 Bucca he's been processed, he's been rehabilitated,
16 there is a disagreement on whether he should be
17 released -- if that's one of the ones that should be
18 released or not.

19 Now to go back to your question, yes, it
20 has been resolved, because we have all agreed that the
21 final say goes to the guy on the ground that knows the
22 situation on the ground where that detainee is going

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1 back into.

2 In many cases, he doesn't know the
3 circumstances of the capture other than what is on
4 paper, because it could have happened two years ago
5 before he was the battle space owner. But he does
6 talk to the tribal leaders in that area every day. He
7 does talk to the local leadership. He does talk to
8 provincial leadership in that area every day, and so
9 in determining the impact of that guy coming back to
10 that part of the Iraqi society, I think -- and it's
11 the right decision -- he has final say on whether that
12 detainee is released or not, with the full
13 understanding we've got to bring the numbers down.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6): Had that not been the
15 case before? Was that one of the reasons there was
16 friction, that the system in place wasn't working
17 smoothly?

18 (b)(3), (b)(6): I think there wasn't --
19 I think the system was working almost too smoothly.
20 It had almost become automatic, and the battle space
21 owners were being overruled, for whatever reason. So
22 there was somebody above them making -- overruling

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1 their decision.

2 It's falling both ways, though. I think
3 that, you know, if I'm there, I don't want anybody
4 released, coming back into my battle space, and it's
5 just a natural -- So there is a natural conflict
6 there. I don't want any of these bad guys coming back
7 in my battle space. I just got this squared away; so
8 why would you want somebody to come back in that went
9 to Bucca to begin with for setting out IEDs or
10 whatever it was.

11 Then, you know, as numbers grow, there is
12 a natural tendency down in Bucca that we've got to put
13 a cap on this somehow and start to reduce the numbers.
14 And there is a mandatory two-year review. Every two
15 years, they come up for review. I think it's at the
16 two-year mark they come up for review.

17 So a lot of things just kind of came
18 together to create that tension.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Thanks.

20 (b)(6) I'd like you to comment,

21 (b)(3), (b)(6), if you would, on your perception as
22 the 3 on the reconciliation efforts of the Corps.

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1 Particularly, address the Concerned Local Citizens.
2 Is that evolving to different groups.

3 Also please address the ability for the
4 U.S. to continue to pay the local citizens. I know we
5 do it in 90-day increments, and we want to migrate
6 that to the GOI, the Government of Iraq.

7 I wondered if you could address that in a
8 general way.

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) : We will see on
10 reconciliation, and I'm a firm believer that we can't
11 reconcile -- Well, it's not important that we
12 reconcile with insurgents. What is important is the
13 government of Iraq reconciles with the insurgent
14 groups, minus AQI, and there is just -- There is no
15 reconciliation with AQI, in my mind.

16 So really, the CLCs were really a bottoms
17 up approach to reconciliation, which is the only way
18 I think it's going to work. The government of Iraq
19 was not at all in favor of CLCs when we started
20 standing them up, because they were mostly Sunni, and
21 they saw it as -- I think they saws it as us standing
22 up a coup force, for lack of a better way of

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1 describing it.

2 Over time, they have become much more
3 comfortable with the CLC program, and they are --
4 every day they are getting better at incorporating
5 them into the legitimate Iraqi Security Forces, either
6 preferably the Iraqi Police or the Iraqi Army.

7 You run into speed bumps all the time on
8 this and log jams, but they are becoming more and more
9 comfortable, and they are starting to see the value of
10 the CLCs in terms of the security.

11 CLCs were only stood up in areas that we
12 didn't have security forces to hold what we had
13 gained, and south of Baghdad is a great example, the
14 northern area of Jabour area.

15 MND-C went in and cleared that, would hold
16 that for a period of time. There are no Iraqi Army
17 units there. There are no Iraqi Police in that area.

18 So before they could go any further south
19 to continue efforts against al Qaeda, there had to be
20 something to hold that. So a local sheikh comes
21 forward, willing to volunteer 100 of his tribesmen to
22 provide -- to guard infrastructure, to guard a mosque,

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1 to guard a checkpoint.

2 So we hire him or contract him to do that,
3 working -- We leave a small force there to maintain
4 oversight, and we continue further south to continue
5 the operation against al Qaeda or special groups,
6 whichever it is.

7 Then over time, those that want to go into
8 the Iraqi Security Forces, incorporate them into the
9 Iraqi Security Forces. Those that don't, try to find
10 another employment is the concept.

11 Now the money piece of it is can we afford
12 to keep paying them? I think that we can't afford to
13 not keep paying them. There is no doubt in my mind
14 that they have had a significant impact on the
15 security situation, the CLCs.

16 Probably more importantly, I don't think
17 there is any doubt in al Qaeda in Iraq's mind that
18 they have a significant impact on the security
19 situation, because al Qaeda is definitely targeting
20 CLC leaders and CLC groups right now.

21 I don't think they would do that if they
22 weren't having an impact on al Qaeda's operations, and

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1 JAM special groups has targeted them, too. So just
2 the fact that they are being targeted, to me,
3 indicates that they are effective.

4 Now monetarily, I don't know how anybody
5 can argue with this is probably one of the better
6 investments we've ever made. So if you agree with the
7 premise that CLCs are having an impact, a significant
8 impact on the security situation which has led to less
9 U.S. equipment being destroyed, less expenditure of
10 munitions, less flying hours, I think, it is probably
11 one of the better investments of CERT money we have
12 ever made in terms of the savings.

13 That is not even mentioned. The most
14 important thing is how many U.S. and Coalition
15 soldiers' lives have the CLCs saved just by their
16 efforts?

17 People say can we afford to keep paying
18 them. I say we can't afford not to pay them. It's
19 probably the best investment we have ever made over
20 here. Now we don't want to pay them forever, and we
21 do -- We want to pay them as long as they are needed
22 there to provide that security.

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1 When Iraqi Security Forces can replace
2 them or we can get them incorporated into the Iraqi
3 Security Forces or they are no longer needed there for
4 security, then I think -- but we got to transition
5 them to something. And, hopefully, the Iraqi
6 government does that, and not us.

7 [REDACTED] We are coming up on
8 the last couple of minutes. I don't know how tight
9 your schedule is, but I wanted to have an opportunity
10 just to kind of ask you an open-ended -- throw it back
11 to you, given that we are coming down to the last
12 couple of weeks, if you have any broad thoughts that
13 have gone through your mind about what this tour has
14 meant to you personally in, certainly, the most
15 critical staff position in the Corps in what has been
16 a very successful tour here during this last 15
17 months?

18 [REDACTED]: Well, 15 months have gone
19 pretty fast. I wouldn't say that day by day, but
20 looking back on it, 15 months has gone pretty fast.

21 You know, it has been successful. I mean,
22 there's some regrets as I look back. I wish we could

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1 have done a better job on borders, but borders is just
2 hard.

3 We never really came up with a good
4 solution for how to stop the flow of stuff across the
5 border, whether it be foreign fighters on the western
6 borders or munitions, lethal munitions on the eastern
7 border.

8 I wish we had have gotten to Baqubah a
9 little faster than we did. Yeah, there's things along
10 the way -- I guess the thing that sticks out in my
11 mind is -- and once again, I'm a victim of my own
12 experience, so I think back -- is the incredible
13 confidence of our Army, and it's really -- You know,
14 you watch some of the kids are capable of doing.

15 I call them kids, because I'm talking
16 company commanders, in some cases battalion
17 commanders. Brigades -- just incredible good brigade
18 commanders. Division leadership I've worked with,
19 staffs - just incredibly good.

20 You know, I look at where the Army was in
21 2003, I guess, when we started this, and I look at
22 what captains, sergeants, lieutenants, lieutenant

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1 colonels, majors.

2 Their confidence level and what they are
3 able to do right now is just -- and no matter how this
4 turns out, our Army has -- and Marine Corps and Navy,
5 I think, and Air Force has just done a remarkable job
6 and grown significantly.

7 We've never had much success in COIN,
8 counterinsurgency operations. I don't know if this is
9 going to be a success or not. I'm not even sure it
10 is, counterinsurgency operation, sometimes.

11 General Odierno has been probably the best
12 commander I've ever worked for, able to make a
13 decision very quickly and has just an incredible
14 instinct for what's going on out there. He is very
15 good with his commanders.

16 He does more battlefield circulation than
17 I ever gave him credit for. He said he was going to
18 spend most of his time out. I seriously doubted it,
19 but he has, and he gets out with company commanders,
20 with platoon leaders, walks the streets. He just has
21 an incredible feel for what's going on out there,
22 which significantly helps the planners and me when we

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1 are making recommendations and discussions with him.

2 I think that's just -- That's the most of
3 it, just stuff that I never could have done as a
4 company commander, battalion commander, is being done
5 routinely now.

6 (b)(6): Let me follow that up just a
7 bit, and we'll get you out of here. But in looking
8 back on what you just said in a general sense, I
9 wondered if you could look back and identify two,
10 perhaps three, critical decision points that you think
11 General Odierno and the staff of 3 Corps made during
12 the past 14 months?

13 (b 3, b 6) I think -- and it was a
14 hard decision for him, taking (b 3 b(6)) and 32
15 Stryker Brigade out of Baghdad and sending them to
16 Baqubah was a critical decision, to go up in there and
17 clear Baqubah, and that was during Phantom -- trying
18 to think if that was part of Phantom Thunder or
19 Phantom Strike.

20 Doesn't really matter, but 32 Stryker had
21 operated up in Mosul into Baghdad, and when we were
22 here, they were in Baghdad, pulled them out of Baghdad

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1 and sent them to Baqubah to reinforce 31 Cav and clear
2 Baqubah.

3 I think that was a critical decision and
4 absolutely the right decision, because that got al
5 Qaeda out of what they were then claiming as their
6 capital in Baqubah.

7 I think, although it's come with a lot of
8 -- really, even earlier than that, the decision to go
9 ahead and fight to get the five brigades. And you
10 know, it wasn't just we showed up and five brigades
11 showed up behind us. I mean, there was a little bit
12 of a tussle on getting those five brigades.

13 Then probably more importantly, the
14 decisions that he made on where to employ them,
15 because the five brigades were coming to secure
16 Baghdad, and there was a little bit of angst, and
17 there in the summer when things weren't looking real
18 good, there was a little bit of concern that maybe we
19 had put them or planned to put them in the wrong spot.
20 I say wrong spots -- outside of Baghdad, not
21 physically sitting in Baghdad.

22 It all went back to the theory that you

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1 had to interdict accelerants of violence coming into
2 Baghdad. So I mean his decision to deploy them in the
3 Belts and really follow the Belt theory, 32 Stryker to
4 Baqubah.

5 Then the entire year, 15 months, the
6 philosophy he has always followed, and I think it's
7 had a less visible but as significant of an impact, is
8 his focus and his drive to focus his staff on output
9 and enabling division and brigade commanders to do
10 their job.

11 ISR is a great example. We've got 10 to
12 15 times more ISR in theater right now than we had the
13 last time the Corps was here, and we hold none of it
14 at Corps level. It's all pushed out.

15 So he is very subordinate commander
16 focused. He has told us more times than I care to
17 count that the only reason the Corps staff is here is
18 to enable divisions and brigades to execute their
19 fight.

20 So -- and that doesn't just jump out one
21 day and hit you, but over the course of 15 months, I
22 think that has been a -- and that's not really a

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1 decision. That's just the way he is. I think that's
2 absolutely correct in this theater. It is a
3 decentralized fight.

4 (b)(6) Okay. Well, thank you.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6): Great. (b)(3), (b)(6) do you
6 have time for one or two more or do you have to go on
7 to your next --

8 (b)(3), (b)(6): I have no idea what I've
9 got, but go ahead.

10 (b)(3), (b)(6): Just because this is
11 our last kind of chance to catch you. So just one or
12 two more I might like to get in.

13 I just want to talk about the changeover
14 in a couple of divisions since we talked last. Almost
15 within a month after that, we changed over MND-North
16 from the 25th ID to 1st Armored Division. Then in
17 December we changed over in Baghdad from 1st Cav to
18 4th ID.

19 I just kind of wanted to talk about the
20 nuance piece of those command relationships, new
21 staffs coming in, in particular in North where that is
22 still where the hardest fighting is going, the number

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1 of significant acts, you know, five times what
2 everybody else has got.

3 How has the chemistry worked on those
4 changeovers, and again I would probably look at North
5 harder.

6 b 3 b 6) Yes. There is a growing
7 period for any new units coming in. Doesn't matter
8 whether it's division, corps, brigade, battalion, to
9 adjust to their battle space.

10 I think the thing that is unique about
11 North is just what you pointed out, is that they came
12 in at a point where the threat was changing radically
13 from what 25th ID had before them had, before 1st
14 Armored Division, and 25th did a fantastic job. But
15 when you come into a situation that is changing
16 rapidly, some of the benefit of that right seat, left
17 seat and handover experience from the previous unit
18 goes away, because the situation is different very
19 quickly as you are trying to adjust to it.

20 So the 25th -- I'm sorry, 1st Armored
21 Division came into a very difficult situation. I
22 think they've done a fantastic job adjusting to a

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1 threat that was moving their way.

2 That really didn't surprise me, and I
3 don't think it really surprised anybody. We kind of
4 said that all along, that if al Qaeda starts to move,
5 it's going to be north, because it's not rocket
6 science.

7 They tried to turn against them in al
8 Anbar. So they are not going to go west. The Shia
9 dominate the south. So they are not going to go
10 south. They couldn't stay in Baghdad. So I mean,
11 there's really only one place for them. They can't go
12 east to Iran, you know. So there's only one place for
13 them to go.

14 The other thing that North has -- whether
15 it's 25th or 1st Armor -- has working against them is
16 just generally distance. I mean, it's just a huge
17 battle space, and what is going on in one corner of
18 the battle space is just uniquely different than what
19 is going on in another corner.

20 That's -- You know, Baghdad, MND-B is the
21 main effort, has been the main effort, will remain the
22 main effort. One of the ways you weight a main effort

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1 is by reducing the amount of battle space it's got to
2 be concerned with.

3 So you look at Baghdad, the battle space.
4 It is the city of Baghdad and a little bit of terrain
5 north and toward Taji, Tarmiyah (Phonetic) and a
6 little bit out to the west toward ASR Golden, but not
7 -- MND-North's battle space is probably 10 times that
8 big with all the Kurdish issues, Turkmen issues, Sunni
9 Arab issues, Shia issues, border issues on both
10 borders.

11 So it is a difficult transition in North,
12 I think a much more difficult transition than for MND-
13 Baghdad, and I think it takes longer. But like I
14 said, I think 1st Armor is on it.

15 They came into a different situation that
16 25th ID really couldn't prepare them for. So it has
17 taken a little bit longer, in my opinion, to get
18 things back on track, but they are back on track, and
19 they are engaged in Mosul.

20 They are engaged in Diyala, a significant
21 fight down along Lake Tharthar (Phonetic) the other
22 day, significant cache finds west of Samarra. They

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1 got the Jazeera (Phonetic) Desert, which is the next
2 place al Qaeda is going to migrate to, in my opinion.

3 So the fight is going to remain up north
4 for a while.

5 (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I'd like you
6 to reflect a little bit about General Petraeus'
7 arrival here, what changes his leadership at MNF has
8 provided to the Corps, and the relationship -- in your
9 estimation, the relationship between General Odierno
10 and General Petraeus.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) You know, after -- I
12 forget what month General Petraeus got here. It
13 wasn't too long after we got here, three months, two
14 months.

15 (b)(6) Two months.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6): I think General Odierno
17 and General Petraeus -- Number one, they've known each
18 other for a long time. So that helps. They were
19 division commanders together here back in '03-'04. So
20 that helps, and I think they are of a like mind.

21 I think the thing that General Petraeus
22 brought is -- and this should come as no surprise --

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1 is this is all about protecting the population, that
2 you cannot achieve an increase in the effectiveness of
3 governance, you cannot achieve a growing economy, you
4 cannot achieve much of anything else if the population
5 is fearful that they are going to get killed the next
6 day by a car bomb just going to the market to buy some
7 bread, or they can't drive from point A to point B in
8 Baghdad for fear of being stopped by a Shia checkpoint
9 and if I'm a Sunni, I got a Sunni ID card, I'm going
10 to get shot in the back of the head and left on the
11 side of the street.

12 I mean, it's hard for a society to grow
13 and develop with that type of real fear out there. So
14 what he brought with him was this was about getting
15 off the big FOBs, living and working amongst the
16 population to provide that security jointly with the
17 Iraqis.

18 I think General Odierno agrees 100 percent
19 with that philosophy, has from the beginning. So I
20 think the power of Generals Petraeus and Odierno
21 together are a like vision and a complete agreement on
22 the way forward.

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1 There are things they don't agree on, but
2 it is not anything significant. Where this needs to
3 go, how we transition which is the other piece of it,
4 and it's not unplugging -- it is a very slow,
5 methodical, as conditions permit, not timeline driven
6 transition of responsibility to a fully capable -- not
7 fully but a capable Iraqi Security Force -- they both
8 agree on that.

9 So I mean, I think those are the main
10 things that he brought.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) When we look at Op
12 plan 08-01 and the idea of going back down to the pre-
13 surge levels, but also at the same time some of our
14 key Coalition force allies going away by mid-2008, the
15 Brits, the Australians, the Poles, what are you saying
16 as the way ahead as you transition that piece over to
17 18th Airborne Corps?

18 (b)(3), (b)(6) I don't think the Brits
19 are going away. I think they are going down in
20 numbers. The Poles will go. The Aussies will go.
21 When I say the Aussies will go, it's really only the
22 contingent that is at Tillil, which is only about a

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1 third of their contribution. The rest of it will
2 remain, you know, the core staff, 4 staff, etcetera,
3 etcetera.

4 You know, you would have a couple of
5 options. You either replace it with other Coalition
6 forces, to include U.S. potentially, you turn the
7 facilities and the responsibilities over to the
8 Iraqis, or you just don't cover down on it. You know,
9 out of all those, just don't cover down on it is not
10 an option.

11 So it would either get transitioned to,
12 most likely, U.S. or Iraqi Security Forces.
13 Diwaniyah, for example, probably be a combination of
14 both. Talk about -- There was another battalion
15 destined for Diwaniyah that is in force generation
16 right now.

17 Kadisiyah (Phonetic) Province, when
18 Center South finally folds their division colors later
19 this year, will probably fall under the MND-C, and
20 there will probably be a U.S. at some level presence
21 put on FOB Echo.

22 The Australian battle group that is at

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1 Tallil: 182 is already there, which is the current
2 theater security brigade. So I don't see a huge
3 change. 182 will probably pick up some of the
4 responsibilities of what the Aussie battle group was
5 doing, and we may or may not change that battle space.
6 It currently falls under Southeast, and it's really
7 more about as Southeast reduces their numbers, what
8 are they capable of doing than anything else.

9 (b)(6): That's all I have. I've gone
10 through all of my questions.

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) Good. All right.
12 (b 3 b 6) thanks very much. That concludes this
13 interview. Thank you.

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